A Sahel Strategy at a Crossroads
#France

by　Satoshi MORITA

(Originally published as a Japanese article in International Development Journal, No. 813, September 2024.)

『国際開発ジャーナル』2024年9月号掲載記事

Executive Summary

1. Overview and Rationale

Since 2020, a wave of coups has swept through former French colonies in West Africa, bringing military governments to power in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In the years that followed, these three countries withdrew from the regional frameworks G5 Sahel and ECOWAS, and formed their own alliance instead – the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). French troops have been forced out of the Sahel, while Russia’s Wagner Group has moved in to fill the vacuum. As the former colonial power with deep economic and military ties across the continent, France now faces a fundamental reckoning with its Africa policy. How is France seeking to redefine its engagement with the continent? This article discusses that question from three perspectives: French ODA in the Sahel, the shift in France’s aid approach amid the Sahel crisis, and the diverging paths within the Sahel and France’s response to them.

2. Key Discussion Points

2-1   France’s ODA and Its Focus on the Sahel

France’s ODA has traditionally treated Africa – the Sahel above all – as its top priority region. Under the new development framework law enacted in 2021, one-third of aid to the 19 priority countries is earmarked specifically for the G5 Sahel countries. Historical data, however, reveals that support to the region has been weighted far more heavily toward military assistance than toward development cooperation.

2-2   The Sahel Crisis and the Turn Toward Multilateralism

Facing a triple pressure of rising anti-French sentiment, a wave of coups, and growing Russian influence, France has been forced to rethink its military-heavy, bilateral approach and has instead explored multilateral frameworks through the EU and other channels (the Sahel Alliance, the Coalition for the Sahel, and others). The Takuba Task Force – launched under French leadership and bringing together special forces units from across Europe – was emblematic of this shift, but it was disbanded in June 2022 amid worsening conditions on the ground. President Macron declared that “the age of Françafrique is well over,” signaling a shift from the language of “aid” toward one of “solidarity and partnership.”

2-3   Divided Sahel and France’s Response

The three Sahel countries have charted an independent course through the AES. What stands out is the sheer speed of this shift: within barely six months of forming the alliance in September 2023, the three countries had already announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS and established a joint military force. Amid this, France decided to cut its ODA budget for the three Sahel countries. The other two G5 Sahel countries, Chad and Mauritania, however, have not followed suit, and are said to want to preserve their relationship with France. The AES’s own cohesion is far from solid, leaving open questions about how long the alliance itself will hold together, and how the relationship between France and the Sahel countries will evolve from here.

3. Implications and Insight

What this article ultimately reveals is not simply a story of shrinking aid, but a deeper structural turning point: the old model of French engagement in Africa – heavily militarized and centered on bilateral relationships – is breaking down. With Russia and China expanding their influence in Africa, and fiscal constraints mounting at home, the real question is whether France can build an effective new relationship with Africa through EU coordination. At the same time, if the three Sahel countries continue down their independent path, it may well be they – rather than France – who stand to lose more economically. That asymmetry is the key to understanding what comes next.

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